Boarding up the Fair Housing Act: Time Barring Design and Construction Claims for Handicapped Individuals (Note) by Matthew R. Farley
NOTES
BOARDING UP THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: TIME BARRING
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS FOR
HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS
MATTHEW R. FARLEY*
I. Introduction ............................................... 30
II. The Fair H ousing Act ..................................... 33
A. General Provisions of the FHA and FHAA.......... 33
B. Design and Construction Cases ................... 35
III. The Discovery Rule ................................ 37
A. The Functions of Statutes of Limitations ............ 37
B. What is the Discovery Rule? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
C. The Rationale for the Discovery Rule.............. 39
D. The Discovery Rule and Design and Construction
Claims .. ...................... 41
1. Positive Treatment of the Discovery Rule ........ 41
2. Negative Treatment of the Discovery Rule ....... 42
E. Why the Discovery Rule Should Apply ............. 44
1. Difficulty of Detection ....................... 44
2. Interpreting "Aggrieved"..................... 46
IV. The Continuing Violations Doctrine.................... 47
A. What is the Continuing Violations Doctrine? . . . . . . . . .  47
B. The Rationale for the Continuing Violations
Doctrine .................................... 48
C. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman .................. 49
D. Continuing Violations vs. Continuing Effects ......... 50
E. The Continuing Violations Doctrine and Design and
Construction Claims ............................ 51




1. Positive Treatment of the Continuing Violations
Doctrine ................................. 51
i. Silver State Fair Housing Council v. ERGS ... 51
ii. Other cases ............................ 52
2. Fair Housing Council v. Village of Olde St.
Andrews ................................. 55
i. Factual and Procedural Background .......... 55
ii. Sixth Circuit Opinion ..................... 56
3. Negative Treatment of the Continuing Violations
Doctrine ................................. 57
F. Why the Continuing Violations Doctrine Should
Apply .. .................................... 58
1. Legislative History .......................... 58
2. HUD Guidelines ........................... 59
3. Statutory Language ......................... 59
V. Strict Limitations.................................. 60
A. Moeske v. Miller & Smith, Inc.................... 60
B. Garcia v. Brockway ............................ 60
1. Factual and Procedural Background ............. 60
2. Majority Opinion ........................... 61
3. Dissents.................................. 62
4. Analysis of Garcia, the Supreme Court's
(non)Response, and Suggestions ................. 63
V I. Conclusion ............................................... 66
I. INTRODUCTION
There is one kind of robber whom the law does not strike at, and who
steals what is most precious to men: time.'
-Napoleon I
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, otherwise known as the Fair
Housing Act (FHA), prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and fi-
nancing of residential dwellings based on race, color, religion, or national
origin.2 In 1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(FHAA), which incorporated disability and family composition as pro-
hibited housing criteria. The addition of disabled persons as a protected
class presented unique difficulties, which Congress addressed in the
1. NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, MILITARY MAXIMS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1815).
2. Civil Rights (Fair Housing) Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006).
3. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006)).
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FHAA.4 Specifically, Congress took measures to attend to the distinctive
structural discrimination the disabled may face, unlike other covered clas-
ses.' That is, because the disabled are susceptible to discrimination that
may be inherent in the design or construction of a residential structure
(as apart from sale, rental, or acquisition), Congress enacted provisions
making certain design features unlawful.' These design and construction
provisions differ slightly from the requirements of other legislation,' and
compliance is usually monitored and directed by the United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).8
The addition of the FHAA design and construction provisions is in ac-
cord with the FHA's broad remedial purpose "to provide, within consti-
tutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."'
Despite the design and construction provisions of FHA § 804(f)(3)(C),
many residential dwellings are currently designed and constructed in sub-
stantial noncompliance with the FHAA's mandate and the accessibility
guidelines promulgated by HUD.o At least one commentator has sug-
4. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 17-32 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2178-93.
5. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18-19 n.28, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2178-79 n.28.
6. See Fair Housing Act (FHA) § 804(f)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(c)(2006). Sec-
tion 804 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604. This Note adheres to the common practice by
referring to the section by its public law designation.
7. For example, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires the
removal of architectural barriers in existing facilities, whereas the Fair Housing Act (FHA)
does not. See Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(iv) (2006)
(mandating the removal of structures hindering the mobility of disabled persons in public
accommodations "where such removal is readily achievable.").
8. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is re-
sponsible for enforcing compliance with the FHA and FHAA, among other laws. FHA
§ 808(a). HUD may independently file a complaint against a building owner, architect,
contractor, or other individual involved in the design or construction of a qualifying dwell-
ing. See id. § 810(a)(1)(A)(i).
9. Id. § 801 (declaring the purpose and goals of the fair housing policy).
10. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS wiTH DISABILMES: BARRIERS AT
EVERY STEP 3, 42, 51 (2005), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdflDDS
Barriers.pdf (providing examples of FHAA noncompliance by property owners in a Chi-
cago, Illinois field study). Disabled rental customers seeking new housing in Chicago or
the surrounding area of Cook County are not permitted to inspect the unit thirty percent
of the time due to inaccessibility. Id. at 42. Additionally, disabled persons are often pro-
hibited from making modifications which are necessary to utilize the entirety of the accom-
modation. Id. at 3. "Almost one of every six housing providers who indicated that units
were available refused to allow reasonable unit modifications needed by wheelchair users.
And [nineteen] percent of those with on-site parking refused to make the reasonable ac-
commodation of providing a designated accessible parking space for a wheelchair user."
Id. at 3; see also OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND
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gested that the continued noncompliance is substantially attributable to
the sluggish and mixed judicial interpretation of how the FHA's statute of
limitations applies to design and construction cases." Indeed, federal
courts of appeals have rarely had the opportunity to address this issue
despite the integral role of the FHA, and district courts are sharply di-
vided.12 The problem is (perhaps deceptively) easily stated: When does
the statute of limitations begin to run in FHA claims against the architect
or builder of a noncompliant structure? Does the statute run for an ar-
chitect when the schematics are completed and passed on to the contrac-
tor? Or must the structure be physically complete for the statute to
run?' 3 Alternatively, must the units at issue be occupied prior to the stat-
ute of limitations running, and, if so, to what degree?
The answer to this issue and the numerous questions it invokes is dra-
matically important to disabled individuals. If the judicial response is
that the limitations period begins to run on the completion of the design
or construction period, then disabled individuals may be without recourse
despite promptly filing suit upon discovering or encountering a noncomp-
liant residence. On the other hand, if the response is that the limitations
period does not commence until a plaintiff discovers or encounters an
instance of noncompliance, then architects and builders will be perpetu-
ally exposed to liability-at least for as long as the noncompliant feature
exists. Recent litigation on this topic has manifested at least three distinct
URBAN DEV., MULTIFAMILY BLDG. CONFORMANCE WITH THE FAIR Hous. ACCESSIBILITY
GUIDELINES 16-51 (2003), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/multi
family.pdf (discussing the HUD accessibility guidelines and the statistical analysis utilized
to develop these guidelines).
11. See Robert G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in
"Design and Construction" Cases Under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 753-55
(2006) (attributing confusion among noncompliant builders and owners to a inconsistent
interpretation of the statute of limitations under FHA § 804(f)(3)(C)). Occasionally,
courts have decided in favor of defendants asserting a statute of limitations defense by
applying a statute of repose approach. Id. at 755. These courts ignore the requirements of
§ 804(f)(3)(C) and encourage illegally constructed buildings by the multi-family housing
industry. Id.
12. Only two Circuits, the Sixth and the Ninth, have interpreted the FHA's statute of
limitations, and they reached different results. See Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092,
1101 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding continuing violations did not toll statute of limitations), cert.
denied sub nom., Thompson v. Turk, 129 S. Ct. 724 (2008); Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Vill.
of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 Fed. Appx. 469 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding continuing viola-
tions tolled statute of limitations), cert. denied sub nom., WKB Assocs., Inc. v. Fair Hous.
Council, Inc., 552 U.S. 1130 (2008). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certi-
orari in both appeals, presumably due to the perception that the issue is not ripe for appeal
to the nation's highest court.
13. The notion of structural "completeness" can also be further dissected: Is a building
complete when the last brick is laid? When the landscaping is competed? When the first
tenant takes occupancy? When the last certificate of occupancy is issued?
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outcomes,1 4 the discussion of which is the topic of this Note. Part II de-
tails the relevant portions of the FHA and FHAA, and discusses design
and construction cases generally. Part III reviews the first of the three
judicial responses to the limitations question: the discovery rule. Part IV
reviews the second response: the continuing violations doctrine. Part V
reviews the final response, a bright line rule which I have coined strict
limitations, and discusses the most recent decision on point: Garcia v.
Brockway.15
II. THE FAIR HOUSING Acr
A. General Provisions of the FHA and FHAA
The FHA as amended requires equal housing opportunities for all, re-
gardless of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, . . . national origin"
or disability.16 The FHA applies to single-family dwellings in certain cir-
cumstances" and multi-family dwellings with few exceptions.' 8 As ap-
plied to individuals with disabilities, the FHA prohibits discrimination in
the sale or rental, or discrimination in the terms of the sale or rental be-
cause of disability.' 9 The FHA also requires residential owners or sellers
14. See Parts III-V of this Note.
15. 503 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the statute of limitations begins when
the design and construction phase is completed), cert. denied sub nom., Thompson v. Turk,
129 S. Ct. 724 (2008).
16. Fair Housing Act § 804(a), (f), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f) (2006).
17. If a single-family dwelling is sold or rented without the use of a broker and the
"private individual owner does not own more than three such single-family houses at any
one time," then the FHA does not apply. Id. § 803(b)(1).
18. The FHA covers apartments, condominiums, and other multi-family dwellings un-
less the dwelling is owner-occupied and contains no more than four units (housing four
families residing independently of one another). Id. § 803(b)(2).
19. Id. § 804(f)(1)-(2) (barring discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling to any
person because of a handicap). The relevant portion of the statute prohibits discrimination
based on a disability of:
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold,
rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
Id. Furthermore, the statute provides that it is unlawful
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such
dwelling, because of a handicap of-
(A) that person; or
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold,
rented, or made available; or




to make reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals and to per-
mit reasonable modification to individual dwelling units or common ar-
eas.20  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the FHA defines
discrimination broadly, to include design and construction features that
hinder accessibility for disabled tenants or buyers.2 '
The FHA provides three distinct methods of enforcement and remedy,
each separate from the others, and thus they are able to be employed
concomitantly. First, an individual aggrieved2 2 by a discriminatory hous-
ing practice can file a complaint with HUD. 23 This method usually leads
20. Id. § 804(f)(3)(A)-(B) (defining what constitutes discrimination under the stat-
ute). For purposes of the FHA, discrimination includes:
(A) a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modi-
fications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such
modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the prem-
ises except that, in the case of a rental, the landlord may where it is reasonable to do
so condition permission for a modification on the renter agreeing to restore the
interior of the premises to the condition that existed before the modification, rea-
sonable wear and tear excepted.
(B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling ....
Id.
21. Id. § 804(f)(C) (construing discrimination broadly to include various design and
construction features that impede the mobility and accessibility of disabled tenants). The
statute further defines discrimination as including a refusal to design and construct build-
ings in such a way that:
(i) the public use and common use portions of such dwellings are readily accessible to
and usable by handicapped persons;
(ii) all the doors designed to allow passage into and within all premises within such
dwellings are sufficiently wide to allow passage by handicapped persons in wheel-
chairs; and
(iii) all premises within such dwellings contain the following features of adaptive
design:
(I) an accessible route into and through the dwelling;
(II) light switches, electrical outlets, thermostats, and other environmental controls
in accessible locations;
(1II) reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later installation of grab bars; and
(IV) usable kitchens and bathrooms such that an individual in a wheelchair can
maneuver about the space.
Id.
22. An aggrieved person is defined as "any person who (1) claims to have been in-
jured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured
by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." Fair Housing Act § 802(i), 42
U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2006).
23. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A)(i) (providing that an aggrieved person may file a complaint
with the Secretary of HUD). Enforcement through HUD can also take place pursuant to
the Secretary's own initiative. Id.; see also Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that while "HUD may also
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to an administrative hearing.2 4 Second, an aggrieved individual can seek
the assistance of the Attorney General, who is authorized to bring suit
when a pattern or practice of discrimination is apparent. 25 Third, an ag-
grieved individual is entitled to bring a civil claim in federal or state court
without pursuing either of the aforementioned remedial measures. 6 The
last of these enforcement provisions, private civil suits brought in federal
or state court by aggrieved individuals, is the main focus of this Note.2 7
B. Design and Construction Cases
The design and construction requirements of the FHA apply only to
housing constructed after March 13, 1991.28 The FHA specifically re-
quires residences to be designed and constructed with accessible common
areas;29 handicapped-functional doors;30 "an accessible route into and
through the dwelling;" 3 1 accessible outlets, light switches, and environ-
mental controls;32 bathroom wall reinforcements to allow for future grab
bar installation;33 "and usable kitchens and bathrooms such that an indi-
vidual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the space." 34 HUD has also
interpreted the statute as including a seventh requirement: that the build-
ing have accessible entrances and an accessible route to each unit.3 ' Ar-
file a complaint sua sponte; it's unclear whether HUD is subject to the same limitations
period.").
24. Section 810 governs preliminary matters, including pleadings, conciliation agree-
ments, and service. FHA § 810(a)(1)(A)(ii).
25. Id. § 814(a)-(b) (permitting the Attorney General to initiate a civil action against
any discriminating party in violation of the statute). If reasonable cause supports the belief
that a person or persons are infringing upon the FHAA rights of any individual or group of
individuals and that the denial of these rights gives rise to "an issue of general public
importance," then the Attorney General is authorized to file suit in U.S. district court. Id.
26. Id. § 813(a)(1)(A).
27. The first method, an administrative hearing before HUD, tolls the statute of limi-
tations for private suits. Id. § 813(a)(1)(B). The limitations period for bringing an admin-
istrative suit is one year. Id. § 810(a)(1)(A)(i). The second method, suit by the Attorney
General, has no statute of limitations. See id. § 814. Limiting the focus of this paper to the
two-year statute of limitations in private civil suits serves to streamline the issue.
28. Fair Housing Act § 804(f)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(c) (2006).
29. Id. § 804(f)(3)(C)(i).
30. Id. § 804(f)(3)(C)(ii).
31. Id. § 804(f)(3)(C)(iii)(I).
32. Id. § 804(f)(3)(C)(iii)(II).
33. Fair Housing Act § 804(f)(3)(C)(iii)(III).
34. Id. § 804(f)(3)(C)(iii)(IV).
35. Final Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 9472, 9503 (Mar. 6,
1991) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. Ch. I). For an abridged and concise version of the HUD
design requirements, see OFFICE OF FAIR Hous. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING Acr DESIGN MANUAL 14 (1998) available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdflfairhousing/fairfull.pdf (outlining briefly the seven
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chitects and builders whose designs and structures fail to meet these
standards may be subject to liability under the FHA."
Perhaps the single most troublesome aspect of design and construction
claims for disabled plaintiffs is the statute of limitations." The FHA's
statute of limitations for private citizen suits, including design and con-
struction claims, provides that:
An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate
United States district court or State court not later than 2 years38
after the occurrence or termination of an alleged discriminatory
housing practice, or the breach of a conciliation agreement entered
into under this subchapter,"3 whichever occurs last, to obtain appro-
priate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice or
breach.40
In the vast majority of cases, this statute of limitations needs no judicial
interpretation. The typical FHA case turns on a discrete act of discrimi-
building requirements which regulate the construction of new buildings and dwelling
units); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984) (holding that reasonable administrative agency's reading of organic statute should
be deferred to if the statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is reasonable).
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Id. at 843-44; see also H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2179 (outlining requirements and rationale behind the FHAA).
[The FHAA] requires that in the future ... doors and hallways must be wide enough
to accommodate wheelchairs, switches and other controls must be in convenient loca-
tions, most rooms and spaces must be on an accessible route, and disabled persons
should be able to easily make additional accommodations if needed, such as installing
grab bars in the bathroom, without major renovation or structural change.
Id. In light of the Chevron doctrine, this interpretive rule will likely be given the utmost
deference by Article III courts. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (enunciating the standard of
review for certain agency determinations).
36. Fair Housing Act § 804(f)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(s)(c) (2006).
37. Of course, other difficulties exist for design and construction cases. Of particular
note, plaintiff standing-particularly organizational plaintiffs-and successor liability pre-
sent significant complexities. See Robert G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing:
Enforcement Issues in "Design and Construction" Cases Under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U.
RicH. L. REv. 753, 781-86, 813-33, 859-63 (2006).
38. The FHAA extended the limitations period for private suits to two years, whereas
before it was only 180 days. HR. REP. No. 100-711, at 39 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2200.
39. See FHA § 810(a)-(b) (2006) (detailing such conciliation agreements).
40. Id. § 813(a)(1)(A) (footnotes added).
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nation, upon which the limitations period begins to run.41 However, the
addition of the design and construction requirements of § 804(f)(3)(C)
complicated the determination of an appropriate triggering event for the
limitations period. The difficulty lies in determining when "the occur-
rence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice"42
transpires when the alleged discriminatory practice is a design and con-
struction defect.
III. THE DISCOVERY RULE
A. The Functions of Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations hedge the time available for plaintiffs to assert a
claim for relief.4 3 The key rationale behind statutes of limitations is to
prevent unfairly stale claims from being brought against unsuspecting de-
fendants." The law ultimately aspires to uncover the truth by providing a
structure within which plaintiffs and defendants may substantiate their
respective positions with evidentiary support.4 5 Over time, the eviden-
tiary path to the truth begins to deteriorate as evidence dissipates, memo-
ries fade, and witnesses disappear.4 6 Another primary rationale of
statutes of limitations is to provide repose so that defendants may rely on
the expectation that occurrences in the distant past are settled.4 7 Stated
41. For example, the owner of a residential dwelling who denies occupancy to an in-
terracial couple while offering occupancy to a single white female engages in an act of
discrimination on the date the interracial couple is denied housing. Id. § 810(a)(1)(A)(i).
The limitations period commences instantly. See id. (stating that a victim of discrimination
must file a complaint "not later than one year after an alleged discriminatory housing prac-
tice has occurred or terminated").
42. Id. § 813(a)(1)(A).
43. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185
(1950) (explaining the underlying principle behind a statute of limitations).
44. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Tel. v., Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)
("Statutes of limitation, . . . promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.").
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (noting that statutes of
limitation protect against uncertain judgments resulting from evidence whose dependable-
ness and truth yielding value has depreciated over time). Specifically, the Court reasons
that statutes of limitation "protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence." Id.
The goal of protecting the search for the truth from undependable evidence has less trac-
tion in the context of litigating whether a design or construct is discriminatory in multifam-
ily dwellings, because the discriminating quality of a design or construct will often be
patently obvious. However, the ability to ascertain who is responsible for the design or
construction of the offending violation could depreciate due to the passing of time.
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differently, in addition to protecting the truth from stale evidence, stat-
utes of limitations protect the defendant from unnecessarily elongated
lapses in the initiation of litigation. Finally, statutes of limitations pro-
mote judicial economy and efficiency by restricting claims to those in the
recent past. While courts have acknowledged that the primary purpose of
statutes of limitations is to prevent stale claims, the repose that defend-
ants are offered, while perhaps incidental, serves to discharge liability.4 8
B. What is the Discovery Rule?
While statutes of limitation are normally triggered by the occurrence of
a prohibited event or action, the discovery rule calls for a limitations pe-
riod to run only once "the plaintiff discovers (or reasonably should have
discovered) the injury giving rise to the claim."4 9 The discovery rule es-
sentially "shields a plaintiff from the accrual of a cause of action until he
or she discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelli-
gence should have discovered, that he or she may have an actionable
claim." 0 Some statutes of limitations expressly incorporate the discovery
rule;5' others contain language that courts have held to implicitly invoke
the discovery rule.5 2
The conceptual interpretation of the discovery rule has been mixed.
While some courts and commentators have asserted that the discovery
48. See Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) (1988) ("Statutes of
limitation ... are primarily instruments of public policy and of court management, and do
not confer upon defendants any right to be free from liability, although this may be their
effect.") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
49. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004). Typically, the discovery rule arises
in situations where the injury is inherently difficult to detect. Id.
50. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 179 (2006) (discussing the fundamental
tenets of the discovery rule).
51. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) (2006) (statute of limitations for actions by the
United States is tolled for as long as "facts material to the right of action are not known
and reasonably could not be known by an official of the United States charged with the
responsibility to act in the circumstances").
52. See, e.g., Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113 (holding the term "accrual" in the Federal Tort
Claims Act indicated that Congress intended application of the discovery rule). Kubrick
involved a plaintiff bringing a claim under the Federal Tort claims act for injuries sustained
during treatment in a Veterans' Administration hospital. Id. at 113-14. In applying the
discovery rule, the Court distinguished between discovery of the plaintiff's injury and dis-
covery of the cause of his injury. Id. at 122. The Court held that accrual of a claim did not
require the plaintiff to know that his injury was negligently caused; only that he was aware
of his injury. Id. at 123; Bi-State Dev. Co. v. Shafer, Kline & Warren, Inc., 990 P.2d 159,
518-19 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (requiring injury to be "reasonably ascertainable" for the
statute of limitations period to begin).
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rule is a means of tolling a limitations period,s" others have claimed that
the discovery rule determines when the plaintiff's underlying, substantive
claim accrues. 5' Although the distinction is an important one for ag-
grieved plaintiffs," both interpretations protect the right of action of an
ignorant plaintiff, and so the difference is ignored for purposes of this
Note.
C. The Rationale for the Discovery Rule
Courts are often more willing to apply the discovery rule in cases in-
volving a claim which is unusually difficult to detect.56 This is a main
rationale for the discovery rule; namely, that it is unfair to deny an inno-
cent and ignorant plaintiff relief when a defendant violates the law and
wrongs the plaintiff. This justification for the discovery rule is an affirma-
tion of the policy underlying statutes of limitation in the first place. If
statutes of limitation are designed to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on
their rights, then the discovery rule is a safety valve of sorts, providing
53. See, e.g., Cal. Sansome Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 55 F.3d 1402, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that "[t]he 'discovery rule,' . . . assumes that the elements of accrual including
harm exist, but tolls the ruling of the statute until the plaintiff is on inquiry notice of its
injury (and its wrongful cause)."). The burden of proof is on the party claiming the delay
in the discovery of the injury. Id. More specifically, the plaintiff is required "to plead and
prove the facts necessary to toll the limitations period once it is established that it would
have otherwise commenced." Id.
54. See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (ex-
plaining that a cause of action can sometimes accrue when it is discovered, even if it is after
the injury has occurred). In this age discrimination case, the court determined that if the
plaintiff did not realize his injury until the day he was terminated, "the statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run till that day and his suit is not time-barred." Id.
55. See James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doc-
trine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15
VA. ENvTL. L.J. 589, 597 (1996) (distinguishing between the discovery rule and the concept
of tolling). It is conceptually helpful to understand that "[t]olling is an equitable means of
suspending application of a statute of limitations where a claim has already accrued and
the limitations period has already started to run." Id. On the other hand, the application
of the discovery rule has the effect of postponing the very accrual of the cause of action.
Id. Therefore, the discovery rule is different in that it preserves the plaintiff's ability to
benefit from the entire limitations period, rather than merely benefit from the portion still
remaining after the statute is tolled. Id.
56. See Geo. Knight & Co. v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 170 F.3d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that for a statute of limitations to be tolled pursuant to the discovery rule, the
cause of action must have been "inherently unknowable" when the injury occurred); see
also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 179 (2000) (explaining that the discovery rule
applies "only if the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable.").
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equitable relief for plaintiffs who did not know they had a right to sleep
on it in the first place.
A second justification for the discovery rule has already been touched
upon: the plain language of a statute may expressly or implicitly call upon
some form of the discovery rule.5 Statutes which define a cause of action
as dependent on the plaintiff's discovery are clearly employing the dis-
covery rule. Statutes that have been interpreted as implicitly or impliedly
using the discovery rule are not as easy to recognize, and they are not
uniformly interpreted. The analysis of one court is informative on the
construction of statutory language, and how that interpretation informs
the application of the discovery rule when not expressly employed:
The Fourth Circuit refused to apply the discovery rule [in an age
discrimination case] because the statutory language of the [Age Dis-
crimination Employment Act] clearly and unambiguously states that
the clock begins to run from the occurrence of the violation, not its
discovery, or . . . its accrual.59 . . . Conversely, the Fourth Circuit has
applied the discovery rule where the statutory language is ambiguous
or vague and employs such key words as "accrues" or "arises."60
In other words, statutory language implicating a discrete act or occur-
rence will usually be construed as omitting the discovery rule. Con-
versely, statutory language mentioning the "accrual" or "arising" of a
claim is typically interpreted as appealing to the discovery rule.
A final-and not wholly independent-justification for the discovery
rule is the notion of justice and equity in judicial administration. As one
57. See James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doc-
trine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15
VA. ENvTL. L.J. 589, 600-01 (1996) (concluding that "the discovery rule is consistent with
the primary policy of statutes of limitations of discouraging stale, dilatory lawsuits because
a plaintiff who has not discovered the basis for the claim cannot bring it any more
promptly.").
58. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c) (2006) (statute of limitations for actions brought by
the United States is tolled for as long as "facts material to the right of action are not known
and reasonably could not be known by an official of the United States charged with the
responsibility to act in the circumstances"); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113
(1979) (applying the discovery rule to a plaintiff bringing a medical malpractice claim); Bi-
State Devel. Co. v. Shafer, Kline & Warren, Inc., 990 P.2d 159, 518-19 (1999) (requiring an
injury to be "reasonably ascertainable" before the limitations period begins). The court
determined that the statute of limitations barred Bi-State's negligence claim because the
injury became "reasonably ascertainable" the day the easement was executed and re-
corded as a public record. Id. at 519.
59. Moeske v. Miller & Smith Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 509 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing
Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 87-89 (4th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added).
60. Id. (citing Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995) and Hamilton v. 1st
Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 87-89 (4th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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court aptly wrote, "To say to one who has been wronged, 'You had a
remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped
you of your remedy,' makes a mockery of the law."6 1
D. The Discovery Rule and Design and Construction Claims
1. Positive Treatment of the Discovery Rule
Courts have rarely applied the discovery rule to FHA design and con-
struction claims. In the few instances where the discovery rule has been
addressed, examination of the discovery rule has generally been either
cursory or negative.62 Positive or neutral discussion of the discovery the-
ory as applied to the FHA is limited to two district court cases, and both
were ultimately decided on the continuing violations doctrine rather than
the discovery rule." Despite this, both cases acknowledged the discovery
rule, lending some credence to the rule's availability in privately-brought
design and construction cases.
In Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Associates, the
plaintiffs brought suit against a developer alleging that that its housing
project was not wheelchair accessible.' The defendants in Eastern Para-
lyzed Veterans urged use of the date on which the plaintiff "became aware
of the defendants' allegedly discriminatory housing practice" as the ap-
propriate triggering event.65 Although ostensibly aware of the discovery
rule,66 the court ultimately found the statute of limitations had not run
based solely on a continuing violations theory-a conclusion perhaps in-
fluenced by the fact that the discovery rule would not save the plaintiffs'
case. In Montana Fair Housing, Inc. v. American Capital Development,
Inc.,6 a handicapped resident and applicant for low-income housing
brought suit against the architect, builders, and owners for violations of
61. Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Or. 1966) (presenting a rational approach to
the limitations period on behalf of those who do not discover an injury until after the
limitations period has ended) (citation omitted).
62. See Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that "The
FHA's limitations period does not start when a particular disabled person is injured by a
housing practice, but by 'the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory
housing practice."'); see also Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 125 (acknowledging that "statutes of
limitations often make it impossible to enforce what were otherwise perfectly valid
claims.").
63. See E. Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp. 2d 203
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Mont. Fair Hous. Inc. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (D.
Mont. 1999).
64. E. Paralyzed Veterans, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 212-13.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (D. Mont. 1999).
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accessibility standards." Similar to Eastern Paralyzed Veterans, the court
in Montana Fair Housing acknowledged the discovery rule in stating that
the earliest the limitations period could begin was when the plaintiffs
took residence because that was when the violations "were apparent."6 9
2. Negative Treatment of the Discovery Rule
A third district court decision has espoused the view that based on the
language of the FHA, the discovery rule does not apply to design and
construction claims. In Moeske v. Miller & Smith, Inc.,7o a disabled indi-
vidual brought suit against developers, architectural firms, and a condo-
minium association, alleging FHA design and construction violations."
The court in Moeske considered and dismissed plaintiffs' continuing vio-
lations arguments, and then focused on the language of the FHA's statute
of limitations to determine the applicability of the discovery rule.7 2 After
finding that legislative use of the term "occurrence" refers to a tempo-
rally discrete episode of discrimination-for example, the sale of a non-
compliant residence-the Moeske court held "[t]he FHA unambiguously
states that the 'occurrence' of the discriminatory act will trigger the stat-
ute of limitations. Therefore, the discovery rule does not apply here.""
Two subsequent cases have considered the holdings of Moeske, Eastern
Paralyzed Veterans, and Montana Fair Housing. In United States v. Hall-
mark Homes, Inc.,7" a fair housing organization and the government
brought suit against architects and builders, alleging that the common
portions, doorways, and bathrooms of an apartment complex were not
accessible to persons with disabilities." Although Hallmark Homes was
not a private suit, but rather one brought by the government and a fair
housing organization,76 the court looked to Moeske, Eastern Paralyzed
68. Id. at 1059-63 (describing the facts surrounding the litigation and providing a re-
capitulation of the procedural history leading up to this decision).
69. Id. at 1063. Interestingly, in Montana Fair Housing, the discovery rule was argued
not by the plaintiffs, but by the defendants (architect and builder among them). Id. In
effect, then, the court declined to follow the discovery rule, instead opting for the (more
generous) continuing violations rule. Id. On the facts of the case, applying the discovery
rule would have required dismissal because the claims still would have been untimely. See
id. One explanation for this outcome may be the court's inclination to achieve a "just
result"-by providing the plaintiffs with the relief they sought.
70. 202 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Va. 2002).
71. Id. at 494-95.
72. Id. at 509.
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. No. CV01-432-N-EJL, 2003 WL 23219807 (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2003).
75. Id. at *1.
76. The case actually involved two separate claims. The first was filed by the Inter-
mountain Fair Housing Council with HUD under the Fair Housing Act, § 812(a), 42 U.S.C.
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Veterans, and Montana Fair Housing for guidance. The Hallmark Homes
court found the reasoning in Moeske persuasive because it thought the
linguistic statutory analysis the Moeske court undertook was highly in-
formative of the rule's application." In Hallmark Homes, the relevant
statute of limitations mirrored the private-suit statute (an aggrieved per-
son must file a complaint "not later than one year after an alleged dis-
criminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated."" As such, the
Hallmark Homes court followed Moeske in holding that "this language is
not susceptible to an interpretation that permits incorporation of the dis-
covery rule."7 9
In a second case to follow the Moeske court, United States v. Taigen &
Sons, Inc.,so the United States brought suit against a builder and an archi-
tect, alleging that their construction and design violated accessibility stan-
dards of both the FHA and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)." Following Moeske, the Taigen court held that even in a case for
civil penalties, the limitations period begins to run on the date of the al-
leged violation, when the design or construction phase was finished.82
Finally, the most recent design and construction case considering the
discovery rule is Garcia v. Brockway. The Garcia decision consisted of
two cases consolidated on appeal: Garcia v. Brockway and Thompson v.
Gohres Construction Co. In Garcia, a disabled resident of a multifamily
dwelling filed suit against the original builder and architect, as well as the
current owners and managers for violating the FHA's accessibility re-
quirements.8 4 Similarly, in Thompson, a disability rights group brought
suit against the original builder and current owner of an apartment com-
§ 3612(a). Asserting their statutory right under § 812(o), the defendants removed that
claim to federal court rather than continuing with the administrative process. The govern-
ment then initiated a separate claim against the same defendants under § 814(a), and
joined the two suits. The claims allege the same design and construction violations. Hall-
mark Homes, 2003 WL 23219807, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2003).
77. Id. at *2. The linguistic analysis in Moeske focused on the discrete nature of both
words used in the relevant sections of the FHA-"termination" and "occurrence."
Moeske, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
78. Fair Housing Act § 810(a)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (empha-
sis added).
79. Hallmark Homes, 2003 WL 23219807, at *2 (citing Moeske, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
80. 303 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135 (D. Idaho 2003).
81. Id. at 1135.
82. Id. at 1143-44.
83. 503 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2007), affd en banc, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008).
See Part V of this Note for analysis on the Garcia decision. This brief discussion of Garcia
focuses on the court's analysis of the discovery rule as applied to design and construction
cases only.
84. Id. at 1094-95 (providing a background description of the facts surrounding the
case and resulting in litigation).
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plex asserting a FHA design and construction claim on behalf of the or-
ganization's "testers."" While the Garcia court focused on the
continuing violations doctrine, it also addressed the plaintiff's discovery
rule assertion.8 6 Similar to Moeske, the Garcia court held that to employ
the discovery rule would contradict the plain text of the FHA, and that
"the statute of limitations for private civil actions begins to run when the
discriminatory act occurs-not when it's encountered or discovered." 87
The plaintiffs in Garcia had argued that the limitations period could not
commence "until a disabled person is actually damaged by the [discrimi-
natory] practice." 88 In support of their argument, plaintiffs cited to the
Supreme Court, arguing that "[a] damages action under the [FHA]
sounds basically in tort" and thus, the limitations period does not begin
until the plaintiff has a complete cause of action, including actual injury."
The Garcia court rejected this argument, and held that the limitations
period under the statute begins to run not at the point when the violation
was discovered, but when the violation occurred, which in this case was
when the defendant failed to design and construct the dwelling in accor-
dance with FHA regulations.90 While the court acknowledged that the
FHA "sounds basically in tort," it failed to give force to basic tort princi-
ples over the more specific and explicit language of the relevant statutory
provisions.91
E. Why the Discovery Rule Should Apply
1. Difficulty of Detection
As stated previously, a central justification for the discovery rule is the
notion of justice and fairness in judicial proceedings. For this reason,
courts are generally more willing to extend the discovery rule to instances
where an injury or facts or conditions giving rise to a cause of action are
85. Id. at 1095 (discussing the suit initiated by Disabled Rights Action Committee
member, Tamara Thompson). "Testers," in this context, are individuals sent to check for
violations of the FHA or other civil rights statutes. See id.
86. Only one plaintiff, Noll Garcia, asserted the discovery rule in response to defend-
ants' motions to dismiss. Id. at 1099 n.7. Garcia also alternatively argued the continuing
violation doctrine and equitable tolling doctrine. Id.
87. Id. at 1100 (citing the Fair Housing Act § 813(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(a)(1)(A)).
88. Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd en banc, 526 F.3d
456 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
89. Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
90. Id. at 1100 (interpreting FHA § 813(a)(1)(A)).
91. Id. at 1099 ("This passing reference to tort law cannot be read to trump statutory
provisions that deal expressly with the statute of limitations.").
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unusually difficult to detect.9 2 Design and construction cases under the
FHA are frequently difficult for potential plaintiffs to detect. This is cer-
tainly true in comparison with architects and builders, who are-presum-
ably-more familiar with the post-1991 FHA and HUD accessibility
requirements.9 3 The disparity-of-knowledge rationale94 is further bol-
stered in design and construction claims by the text and history of the
FHAA as "a broad mandate to eliminate discrimination against and
equalize housing opportunities for disabled individuals."95 Congress has
further stated that the disability amendments to the FHA are "a clear
pronouncement of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclu-
sion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream." 9 6 If the
purpose and intent of Congress in promulgating and amending the FHA
is to be achieved, it would seem that some equitable limitations mecha-
nism must be read into the statute, giving teeth to the accessibility guar-
antees therein.97 Indeed adopting a strict limitations approach in design
and construction cases-for example, starting the statute of limitations
upon completion of construction or the sale of the first or last unit-lacks
support from a purely textual standpoint and makes very little practical
sense in light of the purposes of the FHA.98
92. This is because the discovery rule imputes knowledge to a plaintiff where injury is
such that it should reasonably be discovered at the time it occurs. That is, the more obvi-
ous an injury or cause of action, the less reasonable ignorance of it will be, and the less
willing courts will be to apply the discovery rule. The contrary is also true.
93. With regard to the discovery rule, one commentator has written, "courts often
have been more inclined to apply the discovery rule where there is a significant disparity in
the ability of the plaintiff, as compared to the defendant, to become aware of critical infor-
mation necessary to know that a wrong has occurred." James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery
Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for
Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 589, 596-97 (1996).
94. The disparity of knowledge was observed and critiqued by Judge Fisher in Garcia:
As a result of [denying the discovery rule's application], disabled persons-the stat-
ute's actual intended beneficiaries-will be stripped of their ability to enforce the
FHA's most important protection [privately-brought design and construction suits]
and instead will be relegated to "reasonable modifications" at their own expense. In
contrast, real estate developers and landlords who ignore the FHA's design require-
ments will receive a free pass once two years have elapsed since a defective building's
construction.
Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J., dissenting), aff'd en
banc, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008).
95. Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the purpose and
interpretation of the FHAA).
96. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179.
97. See Part IV. F. of this Note for a discussion of Congress' incorporation of one
equitable limitations mechanism-the continuing violations doctrine.
98. Accord Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Village of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 Fed.




A second reason for reading a discovery rule into the statute of limita-
tions under FHA § 813 is that such an interpretation would be in substan-
tial accord with the express language of the statute. While many courts
that considered the applicability of the discovery rule to the FHA's stat-
utes of limitations started with the text of the statute, few have given
weight to the word "aggrieved" contained therein. The private suit stat-
ute of limitations reads, in relevant part: "An aggrieved person may [bring
suit] . . . not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of
an alleged discriminatory housing practice, or the breach of a conciliation
agreement . . . whichever occurs last, . . ."9 The Supreme Court has
noted that an action brought for compensation by a victim of housing
discrimination is, in effect, a tort action.100 More recently, the Court reaf-
firmed that characterization and held that when interpreting the FHA,
the Court will assume Congress intended its legislation to incorporate or-
dinary tort principles.' 0 If the notion that the FHA "sounds basically in
tort "102 is accepted, then the word "aggrieved" must be read as requiring
injury for the statute of limitations to run.'0 3 Adopting a strict limitations
period would effectively read the word "aggrieved" right out of the stat-
ute.'0 4 While alluringly simple and predictable, strict limitations will pre-
vent even scrupulous plaintiffs from enforcing their civil rights. Innocent
should start with the construction and design of the housing units), cert. denied sub nom.,
WKB Assocs. v. Fair Hous. Council, Inc., 552 U.S. 1130 (2008).
99. Fair Housing Act § 813(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis
added).
100. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (explaining that courts are permitted
to award damages based upon the breach of a statutorily-created duty).
101. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003).
102. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195 (instructing that damages for a FHA violation must be
recovered in tort).
103. See Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Febar Corp., 522
U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (the general rule is that the limitations period does not begin to run
until a plaintiff has "a complete and present cause of action"); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of
Actions § 112 (2009) ("An injury or damages may be required to be present before an
action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 899 cmt. c (1979) (stating that "[s]tatutes of limitations ordinarily provide that an
action may be commenced only within a specified period after the cause of action arises");
see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (holding that the statute of limitations in
42 U.S.C. § 1983 commences to run when the unlawful act or omission causes damages).
104. But see Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd en banc,
526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008). "[Pjassing reference[s] to tort law cannot be read to trump
statutory provisions that deal expressly with the statute of limitations. The FHA's limita-
tions period does not start when a particular disabled person is injured by a housing prac-




litigants who first suffer discrimination in the design and construction of a
dwelling more than two years after the structure's completion will be pre-
cluded from seeking a remedy under the law. By foreclosing this poten-
tially vast group of plaintiffs from judicial recourse, the text and intent of
the FHA seems thrown by the wayside. A wiser alternative probably
would be to give credence to the words of the law and implement the
discovery rule in design and construction cases.
One court has acknowledged the term "aggrieved" and creatively given
it meaning apart from the statute of limitations. In Garcia, the majority
agreed that the term "aggrieved" as it appears in the statute does, indeed,
refer to a plaintiff's injury, but held that the plaintiff's injury "only comes
into play in determining whether she has standing to bring suit."105
IV. THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONs DOCTRINE
A. What is the Continuing Violations Doctrine?
The continuing violations doctrine is a second mechanism courts have
used to extend the time plaintiffs have to bring suit. Under the continu-
ing violations doctrine, a systematic "policy" or "practice" of discrimina-
tion is actionable even if some or nearly all of the events occur outside
the statute of limitations period.' Plaintiffs who are denied housing are
able to bring claims that would otherwise be time-barred so long as the
last discriminatory act in the ongoing practice falls within the limitations
period.
The continuing violations doctrine initially developed in the context of
labor law disputes,10 7 and was expanded to employment discrimination
suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.108 The continuing
105. Id (emphasis added). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fisher argued that similar
language in other statutes of limitations has been interpreted as a limitations requirement,
not a prerequisite for plaintiff standing. Id. at 1106 (Fisher, J., dissenting). In doing so, he
noted that if the term "aggrieved" is used to determine standing rather than to calculate
the appropriate limitations period, then the statute is one of repose rather than limitations.
Id. at 1107-08.
106. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006)
(drawing a distinction between continuing violations and "continuing effects of a discrete
violation"); Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to a single event that causes continu-
ing injuries). "[T]he continuing violation doctrine does not save an otherwise untimely suit
when 'a single event gives rise to continuing injuries.'" Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318
F.3d 764, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2003).
107. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1050 (5th Cir. 1973) (fail-
ure to pay female employees the same wage rate paid male employees constituted a contin-
uing violation of the Equal Pay Act).
108. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Home Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 310, 311-12 (4th Cir. 1980) (discrimi-
natory wage discrepancy constituted a continuing violation for limitations period under
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violations doctrine has since been held to apply to the FHA where plain-
tiffs allege that there is a pattern, practice, or policy of housing discrimi-
nation, as opposed to discrete, isolated instances of discrimination.' 09 Of
course, divergent views have emerged among courts as to whether an act
is a continuing violation (pattern, practice, or policy) or a past (discrete
and isolated) violation which has continued effects. 1 o
B. The Rationale for the Continuing Violations Doctrine
The main justification for the continuing violations doctrine is that,
where appropriately applied, the problems of stale and fraudulent claims
that statutes of limitations are meant to protect against will not be pre-
sent."' In many continuing violations cases, there is at least some fresh
evidence, alleviating the staleness concern. Further, because the pattern
or practice of discrimination is ongoing, the defendant should be on no-
tice that he is susceptible to suit. A second justification for the continuing
violations doctrine is the notion that some causes of action may be based
on the long-term effects of a course of conduct rather than any single act
viewed in isolation.1 2 This rationale is particularly apt when observed in
the context in which the continuing violations theory gained force: em-
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); see also James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the
Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environ-
mental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 589, 626-30 (1996) (tracing the background and
development of the continuing violations doctrine). The National Labor Relations Board,
shortly after the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, started to apply
the continuing violations theory in response to the six-month limitations period set forth in
§ 10(b) of the Act. James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation
Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims,
15 VA. ENvT. L.J. 589, 626 (1996). However, in federal courts this theory experienced
mixed results. Id. Furthermore, while the theory's existence was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court, they "rejected its application where the conduct occurring within
the limitations period was not a violation." Id. Some federal courts, following the ratifica-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, applied the continuing violation doctrine specifically to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ninety-day statutory time period for
filing complaints. Id. at 627. The doctrine has been utilized in many differing contexts by
federal courts, such as cases involving RICO, the Lanham Act, the Consumer Product
Safety Act, and the Copyright Act. Id. at 629-30.
109. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381 (1982).
110. See Part IV.C. of this Note.
111. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982). ("Where the
challenged violation is a continuing one, the staleness concern disappears.").
112. See James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doc-
trine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15
VA. ENvTL. L.J. 589, 631-32 (1996) (explaining how statutory construction allows for a
more flexible interpretation of the statute of limitations).
48 [Vol. 13:29
FAIR HOUSING ACT
ployment discrimination. 113 For example, hostile work environment
claims are based solely on a pattern or practice of discrimination, and it
would be nearly impossible to bring a cognizable hostile environment
claim without extending the statute of limitations by some means.11 4 The
continuing violations doctrine neatly remedies this problem. As a final
justification, the plain language of many statutes lends itself to the incor-
poration of a continuing violations theory. The same statutory language
to which proponents of the discovery rule cite" 5 can be seen as endorsing
the continuing violations theory. Under this interpretation, limitations
periods that begin when a claim "accrues" or "arises" do not begin to run
until the injury is complete or, alternatively, when the violation ceases to
exist.
C. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman
Almost thirty years ago, in Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman,11 6
the Supreme Court held the continuing violations doctrine applicable to
privately-brought FHA claims in certain circumstances. Havens in-
volved a class action brought (outside the limitations period) against the
owner of an apartment complex in a Richmond, Virginia suburb, and one
of its employees."' The plaintiffs alleged that the owner and employee
were involved in "racial steering" in violation of the FHA." 9 The plain-
113. See Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002) ("We also
hold that consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including
behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for the purposes of as-
sessing liability, so long as an act contributing to that hostile environment takes place
within the statutory time period."). A cause of action initiated beyond the limitations pe-
riod is not barred as long as one of the acts in the continuing chain of violations took place
within the limitations period. Id.; see also Turner v. Saloon Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir.
2010) ("Thus, under Morgan, an employee claiming a hostile work environment 'may file
the charge (under Title VII) . . . within the statutory time from the last hostile
act.'"(citation omitted)).
114. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002); Turner
v. Saloon Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2010).
115. See Part III of this Note.
116. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
117. Id. at 380-81.
118. Id. at 368, 380-81.
119. Id. at 366-67 (1982). "Racial steering" is explained in the complaint by plaintiff
as a:
"[P]ractice by which real estate brokers and agents preserve and encourage patterns of
racial segregation in available housing by steering members of racial and ethnic groups
to buildings occupied by members of such racial and ethnic groups and away from





tiffs in Havens cited multiple instances where Black individuals were
falsely informed that the complex had no vacancies while White individu-
als were told the opposite.120 The plaintiffs also asserted that the alleged
racial steering constituted a pattern or practice that had "deprived [plain-
tiffs] of the benefits of interracial associations." 1 2 1 In response to these
allegations, the Court applied the continuing violations doctrine to the
racial steering charge, stating that to do otherwise would "ignore[ ] the
continuing nature of the alleged violation, . . . [and] undermine[ ] the
broad remedial intent of Congress embodied in the Act." 1 2 2 The Court
further justified this characterization by saying: "[W]here a plaintiff, pur-
suant to the Fair Housing Act, challenges not just one incident of conduct
violative of the Act, but an unlawful practice that continues into the limi-
tations period, the complaint is timely when it is filed within 180 days123
of the last asserted occurrence of that practice." 1 24 With respect to the
plaintiffs' second argument-that a continuing violations theory should
apply to their claims of receiving false information from the defendants-
the Court held that the doctrine did apply because those were not dis-
crete incidents standing in isolation, but a continuous violation.125 The
overall holding in Havens, then, is that the continuing violations doctrine
is an appropriate equitable device where the alleged discrimination takes
the form of a "practice," "policy," or "pattern," but not in the case of
isolated incidents or discrete acts of discrimination.
D. Continuing Violations vs. Continuing Effects
In considering various continuing violations assertions, courts have rec-
ognized a key distinction between a continuing violation and the continu-
ing effects of a past violation. 1 2 6 This difference is subtle: where a
continuing violation is typically a string of acts or occurrences that com-
prise a pattern or practice of discrimination, a discrete instance of dis-
crimination which has lasting and constant effects will generally not be
120. Id. at 368.
121. Havens, 455 U.S. at 381.
122. Id. at 380.
123. The statute of limitations for private citizen suits was expanded from 180 days to
two years by the FHAA. See 42 Fair Housing Act § 813(a)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)
(1)(A) (2006).
124. Havens, 455 U.S. at 380-81 (citing to the holding of the court).
125. Id. at 381.
126. See, e.g., Jersey Heights Neighborhood Assoc. v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 189
(4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the use of the continuing violation doctrine); Nat'l Adver. Co. v.
City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1991) (examining the difference between
a continuing violation and continually felt effect from a single discriminatory act); Moeske
v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 506-07 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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sufficient to invoke the doctrine. 1 27 The thrust of this distinction is that
the violation itself is ongoing in a continuing violations claim; on the
other hand, if the statutory violation has come and gone although the
effects of that violation that are felt by the plaintiff, then the doctrine
does not extend the limitations period. 2 s It quickly becomes apparent
that the characterization of a claim as either a continuing violation or
merely the continued effects of a past violation will turn on how a partic-
ular statute defines "violation."
E. The Continuing Violations Doctrine and Design and Construction
Claims
1. Positive Treatment of the Continuing Violations Doctrine
i. Silver State Fair Housing Council v. ERGS
A handful of district courts and two circuit courts have had occasion to
consider the continuing violation doctrine and its application to design
and construction claims. In Silver State Fair Housing Council, Inc. v.
ERGS, Inc. ,129 a fair housing organization brought suit against the devel-
oper of two apartment complexes.13 0 The defendant moved for summary
judgment, alleging that the statute of limitations had run because the
plaintiffs brought suit nearly five years after the completion of construc-
tion."1 In finding for the plaintiffs, the Silver State court cited to Havens
for the proposition that complaints are timely when filed within two years
of the last occurrence of a continuing violation.' 3 2 The court explained
that because the development of the apartment complexes was "seamless
in time," the defendant's actions of designing and constructing both com-
plexes in non-compliance were best viewed as a single continuing viola-
tion.13 3 Thus, the Silver State decision was groundbreaking for at least
one point of law: it was the first decision to hold that discrimination in the
design and construction of multiple developments could constitute a sin-
gle continuing violation.
127. See Moeske, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 505-07 (rejecting the continuing violations doc-
trine because the discriminatory act-the design and construction-occurred more than
two years before suit was filed, despite the continuing effects of that act, namely the inac-
cessible features of the building).
128. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) ("The emphasis is not upon
the effects of earlier [acts]; rather, it 'is [upon] whether any present violation exists.'" (cit-
ing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)) (emphasis in original)).
129. 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Nev. 2005).
130. Id. at 1219-20.
131. Id. at 1220-21.
132. Id. at 1221 (citing the holding of the Havens Court, which considers suits filed
within two years of the last discriminatory act a timely filing).
133. Id. at 1220-21.
2010] 51
THE SCHOLAR
The penultimate paragraph in the Silver State court's decision is re-
markable for two reasons. First, the Silver State court agreed with the
holding of a contrary decision, Moeske, in construing the outer limits of
the continuing violations doctrine.' 34 Although it declined to define the
limits of the continuing violations doctrine, the Silver State court agreed
that indefinite liability-such as that advanced by the HUD guide-
linesl35-Could not be supported because such an interpretation would
read the statute of limitations right out of the statute.136 Second, and in
explaining why the plaintiff's claims did not stretch the doctrine to its
limit, the court referenced the discovery rule, whether intentionally or
not.'3 Specifically, it held that the length of time in this case was not
unreasonable because the plaintiff brought suit within five years of con-
struction, within three years of when the statute would have run for dis-
crete-act claims, and just "one year after discovering the alleged
violations."' While perhaps appealing to the notion of equity, 139 it is
difficult to see why the discovery should impact the application or scope
of the continuing violations doctrine. Remember that, in the design and
construction context, the continuing violations doctrine focuses on the
ongoing discriminatory acts of a developer; whereas the discovery rule
aims to achieve equity by focusing on the aggrieved individual's plight
rather than the developer's actions. Thus, the court's inclusion of the dis-
covery rule in its analysis seems misplaced at best.
ii. Other cases
In Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, Inc. v. Lazarus-Burman As-
sociates,1 40 a disabled plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendant's
apartment complex was in violation of the FHA.'4 1 Specifically, the com-
134. See Silver State, 362 F. Supp. at 1222.
135. See generally OFFICE OF FAIR HoUS. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. AND URBAN DEV., FAIR Hous. Acr DESIGN MANUAL (1998), available at http://
www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/fairhousing/fairfull.pdf. The guidelines seek to produce
"a clear statement of HUD's interpretation of the accessibility requirements of the Act" so
individuals will understand what is required of them under the Act. Id. at Preface. Sec-
ondly, the guidelines offer guidance and recommendations regarding alternative accessibil-
ity approaches. Id.




139. This view is supported by the following sentence, which references the "broad
remedial intent of Congress." Id. (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
380 (1982)).
140. 133 F. Supp. 2d 203 (2001).
141. Id. at 205-06.
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plaint alleged that the complex did not have ramps, adequately wide
enough hallways or doorways, or accessible outlets, switches, and envi-
ronmental controls in violation of the design and construction sections of
the FHA.14 2 Because the court found that the complex was in non-com-
pliance for a seven-year period, and, as such, unavailable to wheelchair
users, it held that the defendant had engaged in a continuing violation.14 3
The crux of the continuing violation was mere passive non-compliance
with FHA and HUD guidelines-it was literally the building standing as
it was built. The Eastern Paralyzed Veterans court thus adopted the ex-
pansive interpretation that Silver State and Moeske declined to
implement.
In Montana Fair Housing, Inc. v. American Capital Development, Inc.,
a handicapped resident brought suit against the architect, builder, and
owner of a low-income housing project.'4 4 The Montana Fair Housing
court cited to the Havens decision, explaining that "the continuing viola-
tions doctrine requires that at least one incident of discrimination must
fall within the statute of limitations period."' 4 5 While the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant's FHA violations were continuous, they ad-
mitted that a "cure" took place when a wheelchair ramp was installed
outside of their unit. 14 6 In response to the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court held that the limitations period did not begin to
run, at the earliest, until the accessibility barriers were cured-in this
case, when the ramp was installed allowing complete wheelchair ac-
cess. 1 47 Like Eastern Paralyzed Veterans then, the court in Montana Fair
Housing adopted the most expansive interpretation of the continuing vio-
lations doctrine: that the limitations period does not commence until the
building is brought into full compliance with the FHA and HUD
regulations.
In National Housing Alliance v. A.G. Spanos Construction,'48 fair hous-
ing organizations filed suit against owners and builders, alleging that mul-
tiple apartment complexes were constructed in a manner that denied
access to the disabled.14 9 Plaintiffs essentially asserted the holding in
142. Id. at 212-13 (delineating specific violations alleged by plaintiffs to be violations
of the FHA).
143. Id. (explaining that since the unlawful practice engaged in by defendants was
continuous in nature, defendants were not entitled to a motion to dismiss due to untimely
filing).
144. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060-62 (D. Mont. 1999).
145. Id. at 1063.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 542 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
149. Id. at 1057-58 (describing the facts surrounding the litigation).
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Eastern Paralyzed Veterans and Montana Fair Housing: that the defend-
ants were engaged in a continuing violation since construction of some of
the complexes was still ongoing.15 In response, the defendants argued
that because each instance of construction was a discrete violation of the
FHA, the continuing violations doctrine was wholly inapplicable, and
only those claims brought within two years of respective construction
date were timely.15 1 The Spanos court found defendants' arguments un-
persuasive.1 52 It stated that just as a single instance of racial steering is a
single actionable breach of the FHA, so too is the construction of each
apartment complex.' 53 The court went on the explain that, because the
defendants had been designing and constructing apartment buildings re-
peatedly for nearly two decades, they had engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination sufficient to trigger the continuing violations
doctrine.' It is important to distinguish the rationale behind Spanos
from Eastern Paralyzed Veterans and Montana Fair Housing. Where the
latter two cases held the design and construction of a single complex to be
an ongoing violation until non-compliance is remedied, Spanos declared
that serial construction of multiple complexes gives rise to a continuing
violation. The Spanos decision is thus in accord with the "strict limita-
tions" argument that the statute of limitations begins to run on the com-
pletion of construction. It is possible, then, if the Spanos court had been
presented with discrete claims against each apartment complex individu-
ally, it might have found no continuing violation and no legitimate design
and construction claim for those built more than two years prior or
complaint.
Finally, in Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., a
handicapped individual and a nonprofit housing corporation brought suit
against a condominium association and the builders of the complex for
non-compliant design and construction."' The defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that because two years had passed since both
the completion of construction and the issuance of the last use and occu-
pancy permits, the suit was time-barred.1 56 The Rommel court held that
150. Id. at 1061 (outlining the basic allegations of the plaintiffs).
151. Id. at 1060-61.
152. Id. at 1061.
153. Id. at 1061-62.
154. 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
155. 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (D. Md. 1999) (recapitulating the contentions of the par-
ties and the procedural history surrounding the litigation).
156. Id. at 709 (discussing defendants' argument for judgment as a matter of law due
to the untimeliness of plaintiffs' claims). Defendants claimed plaintiffs were on construc-
tive notice of any alleged violation the moment the use and occupancy permits were issued
for the buildings. Id. Defendants also asserted that the issuance of these permits was the
proper starting point for the limitations period "because it determines whether the build-
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the continuing violations doctrine applied, and extended the triggering
event for the limitations period to the last occurrence of the violation,
which the court found to be the sale of the last inaccessible unit."' This
holding is different from the three above cases because it reads the
FHA's design and construction requirements as inextricably tied to the
sale or rental of new housing, and it was later adopted by one of only two
courts of appeals to weigh in on the issue. 5
2. Fair Housing Council v. Village of Olde St. Andrews
i. Factual and Procedural Background
One of the most recent cases affirming application of the continuing
violations doctrine to design and construction cases under the FHA is
Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Village of Olde St. Andrews.15 1 In Village of
Olde St. Andrews, a nonprofit housing corporation brought suit in district
court against an architect, a building company, and a homeowners' asso-
ciation, claiming that several residential properties were not accessible to
handicapped persons under the FHA as amended by the FHAA. 16 0 In
response, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment challeng-
ing the organization's standing and asserting that the claims were not
timely.16 1 The plaintiffs replied that "the continuing existence of FHAA
non-compliant buildings constitutes a continuing violation under the
FHAA."'16 2 They asserted the broadest interpretation of the continuing
violations doctrine, just as the Eastern Paralyzed and Montana Fair Hous-
ing plaintiffs had. The court denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment, finding that the plaintiffs had organizational standing to sue
and that the claims were not time-barred because the statute of limita-
ings are subject to the FHAA, it is the first time the buildings are available to the public,
and it is the time when all events are necessary to state a claim occurred." Id.
157. Id. at 709-10 (explaining how the application of continuing violations doctrine
allowed plaintiffs to successfully assert their claims).
158. See Part IV.E.2 of this Note.
159. See generally 250 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
160. Id. at 709-11 (discussing in detail the FHAA violations plaintiffs alleged existed
at the Village). Violations discovered by FHC agents included impermissibly narrow door-
ways, building entrances which required an individual to scale six to eight inch steps, lack
of solid reinforcement in bathrooms which is required for grab bar installation and inacces-
sible sinks, electrical outlets, and environmental controls. Id. at 710-11.
161. Id. at 708 (delineating defendants' claim that plaintiffs' cause of action is partially
barred due to the untimeliness of the filing). Defendants attacked the plaintiffs' standing
in addition to claiming entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law, alleging that their
developments are not required to comply with FHAA. Id.
162. Id. at 718.
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tions did not run until the last unit was initially sold.'13 In reaching that
conclusion, the court stated that the discriminatory act at issue was the
design and construction of the dwellings for sale or rental under
§ 804(f)(3)(C).'" Reiterating the distinction between continuing viola-
tions and the continued effects of a past violation, 65 the court ultimately
held that "the last asserted occurrence of the [discriminatory] practice ...
occurred when the last unit was sold[,] which occurred within two years of
this suit."166 Maintaining that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred, the
defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit.1 6 7
ii. Sixth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the parties maintained their arguments with regard to the
limitations period. The defendants contended that the appropriate trig-
gering event was "completion of the design and construction" phase on
the dwellings. 1 68 Alternatively, the plaintiffs maintained that the continu-
ing violations doctrine applied with sweeping force: they argued that the
limitations period does not begin to run until the accessibility barriers
were completely remedied.' 6  The Sixth Circuit declined to follow either
party's argument, and instead affirmed the district court's ruling that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last non-compliant
unit is sold.170 In its analysis, the court stated that neither party's view-
point was grounded in the text of the relevant FHA provision.171 On the
one hand, the court held that the limitations period must extend beyond
the completion of construction because the FHA focuses on housing dis-
crimination in the context of sale or rental. 1 7 2 On the other hand, the
163. Id. at 718-19 (holding the complaint was filed within the two year statutory pe-
riod based upon a limitations period that began with the last unlawful practice). "The
continuing violation doctrine does in fact apply so long as there is some ongoing act being
performed as it pertains to the design and construction of the development. The mere
existence of a non-compliant building, however, is not an act." Id. at 719.
164. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
165. See Part IV.D. of this Note.
166. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
167. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 Fed. App'x 469
(6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., WKB Assocs., Inc. v. Fair Hous. Council, Inc., 552
U.S. 1130 (2008).
168. Id. at 480 (6th Cir. 2006) (illustrating defendant's continued position on appeal
that the claims are barred by the limitations period).
169. Id. at 479 (discussing the major tenet of Plaintiff's argument).
170. Id. at 481.
171. Id. at 479-80.
172. Fair Hous Council, Inc. v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 Fed. App'x 469,
479-80 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., WKB Assocs., Inc. v. Fair Hous. Council,
Inc., 552 U.S. 1130 (2008). The court referred to the interpretation that the design and
construction provision-FHA § 804(f)(3)-is a definitional counterpart to the substantive
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court held the limitations period cannot extend until the design and con-
struction defects are completely cured, as the plaintiffs urged.17 3
In concluding its opinion, the court in Village of Olde St. Andrews
noted that the limitations period should be evaluated based on case-spe-
cific facts and circumstances.17 4 First, the court said that in cases where a
plaintiff alleges a pattern, practice, or policy of designing and constructing
in violation of the FHA, the statute of limitations begins to run only after
the sale of the last property-the sale being the most recent incident of
discriminatory behavior. 17 1 Second, the court said that in cases alleging a
single discriminatory violation rather than a continuing violation, the dis-
covery rule applies.1 7 1 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that the statute of
limitations will never begin to run on the completion of construction, but
rather, at the sale of the last unit or upon the plaintiffs discovery of the
non-conforming conditions, depending on the facts.
3. Negative Treatment of the Continuing Violations Doctrine
A number of courts have declined to apply the continuing violations
doctrine to FHA design and construction cases. The leading argument
against the doctrine's application is the distinction between a continuing
violation and the continued effects of a past violation. 177
In Moeske v. Miller & Smith, Inc., the first case to make such a distinc-
tion in a design and construction suit, a disabled plaintiff and an organiza-
tional plaintiff sued architectural firms and four condominium
associations, alleging that the design and construction of the exterior and
provisions immediately preceding it-§ 804(f)(1)-(2). See Fair Housing Act § 804(f), 42
U.S.C. § 3904(f)(2006). The first two provisions make it illegal to "discriminate" in the sale
or rental, or in the terms of sale or rental of a dwelling. Id. § 804(f)(1)-(2). The third
provision defines discrimination as including designing and constructing covered housing in
non-compliance with other portions of the statute. Id. § 804(f)(3). Thus, while the viola-
tive act may be the design and construction in non-compliance with the FHA, the court
read the plaintiffs' rights as inextricably connected with the sale or rental of the non-com-
pliant dwelling. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 Fed. App'x 469, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2006).
As such, the limitations period had to extend at least to the sale or rental of the disputed
units.
173. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 210 Fed. App'x 469,
489 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., WKB Assocs., Inc. v. Fair Hous. Council, Inc.,
552 U.S. 1130 (2008).
174. Id. at 481.
175. Id. ("[I]n cases where the plaintiff alleges that the owner of a multi-family hous-
ing development failed to design and construct the development so as to make it accessible
to disabled individuals, the limitations period will depend on the specific circumstances of
each case.").
176. Id. ("[T]he limitations period ... would begin to run from the date that individ-
ual attempted to buy the unit and discovered the nonconforming conditions.").
177. See Part IV.D. of this Note.
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common areas did not comport with the requirements of the FHA. 7 In
their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that the statute had run
because the continuing effects of a design and construction process did
not constitute a continuing violation.1 79 The Moeske court sided with the
defendants, stating "application of the continuing violation doctrine re-
quires that defendants[ ] repeat acts regardless of whether the alleged dis-
crimination is based on race, gender or disability."1s 0 In finding that the
defendants had engaged in a single discriminatory act-designing and
constructing in non-compliance with the FHA-the court held that the
continuing violations doctrine did not apply.' For the Moeske court, the
proper focus was on the defendants' actions, not the continued existence
of inaccessible features to which those acts lead.18 2 To hold otherwise,
the court noted, would eliminate the statute of limitations from design
and construction provisions altogether.' 8 3
F. Why the Continuing Violations Doctrine Should Apply
1. Legislative History
Perhaps the most forceful argument to incorporate the continuing vio-
lations doctrine into the interpretation of the FHA's statute of limitations
is the legislative history of the FHAA. The FHAA amended the FHA by
adding the words "or termination" to the private-suit statute of limita-
tions.1" In commenting on the impact of that addition, the House of
Representatives declared that the addition "is intended to reaffirm the
concept of continuing violations, under which the statute of limitations is
measured from the date of the last asserted occurrence of the unlawful
practice.""" Read in conjunction with the courts' interpretation that the
FHA represents a "broad mandate to eliminate discrimination against
178. 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 494-96 (E.D. Va. 2002) (describing the factual basis for the
claims filed against defendants).
179. Id. at 500-01.
180. Id. at 504.
181. Id. at 507. The Moeske court noted that there are two types of continuing viola-
tions: serial and systemic. Id. at 504. Serial continuing violations are manifested in a suc-
cession of related acts, where as systemic continuing violations take the form of a
discriminatory policy or system. Id. The court declined to apply either type of continuing
violations. Id. at 507-09.
182. Id. at 506.
183. Moeske v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 508 (E.D. Va. 2002).
184. Thus, suits must be filed "not later than two years after the occurrence or termi-
nation of an alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . whichever occurs last." Fair Hous-
ing Act § 813(a)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
185. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 33 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2194.
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and equalize housing opportunities for disabled individuals," 8 6 this legis-
lative pronouncement would seem to compel application of the continu-
ing violations doctrine-where appropriate-in some form.
2. HUD Guidelines
Not surprisingly, the guidelines issued by HUD endorse the broadest
application of the continuing violations doctrine in interpreting the
FHA's statute of limitations. The guidelines state: "With respect to the
design and construction requirements, complaints could be filed at any
time that the building continues to be in noncompliance, because the dis-
criminatory housing practice-failure to design and construct the building
in compliance-does not terminate."'"' Under this view, the architect
and builder are susceptible to suit each time a disabled individual suffers
harm and until they bring the structure into compliance with the FHA and
HUD guidelines. While HUD's word is not binding on Article III courts,
the views of the agency charged with enforcing the FHA carry fairly sub-
stantial weight.'8 8
3. Statutory Language
A final argument for the imposition of the continuing violations doc-
trine lies in the text of the disability discrimination provisions.' 89 Under
§ 804(f)(1), it is unlawful "to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to other-
wise make unavailable ... a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a
handicap of .. . that buyer or renter."' 9 0 Since a design or construct that
fails to comply with the FHA and HUD guidelines has the effect of mak-
ing housing unavailable to disabled individuals, the structure is perpetu-
ally in violation of the above FHA section. Conversely, the limitations
period should not begin to run on design and construction claims until
units in challenged developments become available to individuals with
disabilities-that is, until they conform to the requirements of the FHA.
186. Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing the purpose of the
FHAA is to provide discrimination-free housing opportunities for all disabled individuals).
187. OFFICE OF FAIR Hous. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNIrY, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING Acr DESIGN MANUAL 22 (1998), available at http://www.
huduser.org/publications/pdflfairhousing/fairfull.pdf (illustrating the seemingly endless
timeframe in which an individual may file a compliant with the Secretary of HUD). An
aggrieved person has one year from the date of the alleged discriminatory housing practice
to file a complaint. Id.
188. See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979) ("[HUD's]
interpretation of the [FHA] ordinarily commands considerable deference.").
189. FHA § 804(f)(1)-(3).
190. Id. § 804(f)(1)-(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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Only when remediation is fully complete can it be said that the discrimi-
natory housing practice has terminated and the statute begins to run.191
V. STRicr LIMITATIONS
A. Moeske v. Miller & Smith, Inc.192
Recall that the court in Moeske held completion of the construction
phase triggered the two-year statute of limitations for an FHA design and
construction claim against an architect or builder, and that neither the
continuing violations doctrine nor the discovery rule extended to post-
pone the running of that statute. 193 The court focused its analysis on the
architects' acts rather than the continuing inaccessible features those acts
caused. 19 4 in so holding, the Moeske court explained that "it strains stat-
utory construction of the FHA to unreasonable limits to read 'continuing'
into the very existence of a completed FHA non-compliant building....
Judicial expansion of liability into infinite limits is not supported by the
case law nor the canons of statutory construction."' 9 Thus, the court
failed to expand the continuing violations doctrine to the mere passive
existence of a noncompliant structure, finding that fact insufficient to
constitute an ongoing violation of the law.
B. Garcia v. Brockway
1. Factual and Procedural Background
Garcia v. Brockway is a consolidation of two cases in which the plain-
tiffs alleged violations of the design and construction provisions of the
FHA. In the first case, Garcia v. Brockway, the plaintiff was a tenant at
an apartment complex in Idaho.'9 6 Garcia's apartment did not comply
with the FHA's requirements, and his requests for improvements or relo-
cation were ignored by the management.19 7 Within two years of leasing
the apartment, Garcia sued the owners as well as the original builder and
191. This argument finds further support in the discussion of accessibility in the
FHAA's legislative history. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (providing that units must be accessible to disabled persons; oth-
erwise, disabled persons "are in effect excluded because of their handicap").
192. The complete facts of this case are presented above. See Part IV.E.3. of this
Note.
193. Moeske v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 510 (E.D. Va. 2002).
194. Id. at 506.
195. Id. at 508.
196. Garcia, 503 F.3d at 1094.
197. Id. at 1094-95 (reexamining the cause for the ensuing suit alleging violation of
the FHA).
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architect.19 8 The district court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants, holding that Garcia failed to file within the limitations period,
and Garcia appealed.1 99 In the second case, Thompson v. Gohres Con-
struction Co., the plaintiffs were a civil rights organization and one of the
organization's testers.2 1 One year after a tester inspected the premises,
the plaintiffs brought suit against the original builders and a construction
officer of an apartment complex in Las Vegas, alleging design and con-
struction defects. 201 Again, the district court granted the defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss, holding that the claim was time-barred because suit was
brought more than two years after construction was completed.2 02 The
plaintiffs in both cases appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a panel deci-
sion affirmed the decisions below.2 03 On rehearing en banc, the court
affirmed.20 4
2. Majority Opinion
By an eight to three margin, the court in Garcia held that the alleged
discriminatory practice was the failure to design and construct according
the FHA standards.2 05 As such, it found that the termination of the de-
sign and construction phase triggered the statute of limitations, and speci-
fied that this occurs at the complex's issuance of the last certificate of
occupancy. 206 In reaching this conclusion, the court dealt with plaintiffs'
arguments that equitable devices postponed the running of the statute of
limitations.
First, as to the plaintiffs' continuing violations argument, the court en-
dorsed the holding from Moeske, and held that the plaintiffs were "con-
fus[ing] a continuing violation with the continuing effects of a past
violation. "207 The court also reiterated the apprehension that the Moeske
198. Id. at 1095.
199. Id. at 1094-95 (citing the decision entered by the lower court).
200. Id. at 1095.
201. Garcia, 503 F.3d at 1095.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1101.
204. Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 466 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
205. Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Fair Housing Act
§ 804(f)(3)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(c), affd en banc, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008).
206. Id. (citing FHA § 804(f)(3)(c)).
207. Id. at 1097 (distinguishing between negative effects felt due to a past violation
and effects that continue to be felt because the violation continues to cause harm).
The Supreme Court has "stressed the need to identify with care the specific [discrimi-
natory] practice that is at issue." Here, the practice is "a failure to design and con-
struct," which is not an indefinitely continuing practice, but a discrete instance of
discrimination that terminates at the conclusion of the design-and-construction phase.
This violation differs from one Congress codified as "continuing" in light of Havens,
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court expressed, stating that if the court was to hold that the continuing
violations doctrine applied to the case at bar, then developers and archi-
tects would have no finality, but would be subject to design and construc-
tion litigation indefinitely.208 Apparently, this outcome was too absurd
for the court to stomach.
Second, the court turned to the plaintiffs' encounter rule and discovery
rule arguments. Dispensing with the arguments rather swiftly, the court
stated that the discovery and encounter rules were contrary to the plain
"occurrence or termination" language of the FHA.20 9 The Ninth Circuit
also noted that, with the recent expansion of FHA standing,210 to imple-
ment either the discovery or encounter rule would open the door to a
universe of potential plaintiffs. 2 1 ' Finding these three doctrines inappli-
cable to the plaintiffs' cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute of
limitations in design and construction cases begins to run promptly upon
the completion of construction.2 1 2
3. Dissents
Two cutting dissents, filed by three judges, followed the Garcia court's
majority opinion. Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt adopted Judge
Fisher's dissent, and wrote separately to stress how the majority opinion
"perverts the purpose and intent of the statute." 2 13 This dissent took a
pragmatic approach and applied the majority opinion to different scena-
rios. The authors stated that many disabled persons do not visit, buy, or
lease non-compliant structures until years after a structure is built.2 14
Thus, limiting FHA enforcement mechanisms to a maximum of two years
and offering protection to only those individuals who encounter the non-
compliant structure in that time frame severely limits the scope of the
Act. In concluding, the Pregerson and Reinhardt dissent condemned the
majority for construing the FHA in a manner that fails to accomplish its
where the claims were "based not solely on isolated incidents .... but a continuing
violation manifested in a number of incidents-including at least one . . . that [wa]s
asserted to have occurred within the [limitations] period."
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 381 (1982).
208. Id. at 1098.
209. Id. at 1099-00.
210. Garcia, 503 F.3d at 1096 (citing Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097,
1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that "testers" have standing to sue under the FHA)).
211. Id. at 1100.
212. Id. at 1101.
213. Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 466 (9th Cir. 2008) (Pregerson & Reinhardt,
J.J., dissenting) (en banc).
214. Id. at 467.
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purpose: to eliminate barriers against persons with disabilities and inte-
grate them into the mainstream of American society.2 15
As noted, Judge Fisher also wrote a dissent. Rather than attacking the
effects of the majority opinion, Judge Fisher took issue with the major-
ity's decision in light of the statute's legislative history, plain language,
and administrative agency guidance. First, Judge Fisher pointed to the
pronouncement in the House Report accompanying the FHAA that the
addition of the words "or termination . . . of an alleged discriminatory
housing practice" was intended to incorporate the continuing violations
doctrine.2 16 Next, Judge Fisher argued that the plain text of the FHA
disability provisions compels that it "is triggered when someone is ag-
grieved by one of the unlawful actions specified" therein.2 17 In design
and construction cases, allowing the statute of limitations to run on the
completion of construction triggers the limitations period before anyone
is actually "aggrieved." 2 1 8 Third, this dissent cited the HUD manual,
which endorses the broadest incorporation of the continuing violations
doctrine advanced.2 19 While noting that Article III courts are not com-
pelled to follow the opinion of HUD, Judge Fisher pointed out cases that
uphold HUD's interpretation of the FHA are entitled to significant def-
erence.2 20 Finally, Judge Fisher echoed the other dissenters in stating that
the majority's decision works against the policy goals the FHA was
promulgated to accomplish.2 2 1
4. Analysis of Garcia, the Supreme Court's (non)Response, and
Suggestions
The Garcia opinions differed in two primary respects. First, the major-
ity and dissents disagreed on the appropriate interpretation of the stat-
ute's text. The majority interpreted § 804(f)(3) as defining the statutory
violation-"failure to design and construct. "222 On the other hand, the
dissenters argued that § 804(f) is merely a definitional provision, and the
statutory violation continues as long as the dwelling is "unavailable . . . to
215. Id.
216. Id. at 468 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 469.
218. Garcia, 526 F.3d at 468-69 (en banc) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 475-76.
220. Id. at 476 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)).
221. Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 478 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher, J., dissenting) (en
banc).
222. Id. at 460-61 (majority opinion).
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[any buyer or renter] because of a handicap." 2 2 3 In their view, the dwell-
ing is unavailable until the design defect is remedied.2 24 On this point,
the FHA's disability provision is indeed ambiguous. The language of the
statute seems to support the dissenting viewpoint; § 804(f)(3) begins
"[f]or purposes of this subsection, discrimination includes .. . a failure to
design and construct." 2 25 On the other hand, the organization of § 804(f)
indicates the opposite. § 804(f)(3) is a provision parallel to (f)(1) and
(f)(2), which detail the actions constituting discrimination on the basis of
disability. As such, it would seem logical to interpret § 804(f)(3) as creat-
ing substantive rights as well, the violation of which constitutes discrimi-
nation in and of itself. If that is the case, then understanding design and
construction violations as discrete instances of discriminatory conduct ap-
pears to be correct. Because both interpretations of the statute are en-
tirely plausible, and federal courts have thus far been unable to reach
agreement, a legislative clarification is probably necessary and certainly
desirable.22 6
Second, the opinions differed as to who the court should look to in
determining the appropriate limitations-period trigger. The majority sug-
gested that the proper focus is on the architect or builder, since the viola-
tion occurred in the design and construction phase.22 7 Conversely, the
dissenting opinions suggested that it is inappropriate to allow the limita-
tions period to run before "someone is aggrieved by one of the unlawful
actions specified by [§ 804(f)(3) or § 804(f)(2)] which include design and
construction defects as detailed in § 804(f)(3)(C). 22 8 On this point, the
crucial disagreement is whether the FHA's private-citizen suit statute is
one of limitations or one of repose.22 9 Stated otherwise, is the goal of the
statute of limitations to limit liability for architects and builders or to pre-
vent stale claims from reaching the courts? Again, there is no judicial
223. Id. at 469-71 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (Fair Housing Act § 804(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(1) (2006).
224. Id. at 466 (Pregerson & Reinhardt, J.J., dissenting) (en banc).
225. Fair Housing Act § 804(f)(3), (f)(3)(C).
226. Alternatively, in the interim, deference to HUD's interpretation of the statute is
most desirable.
227. See Garcia, 526 F.3d at 463.
228. Id. at 468-70 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
229. Compare BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1450-51 (8th ed. 2004) (stating the purpose
of a statute of limitations "is to require diligent prosecution of known claims"), with
BLACK'S LAW DICrlONARY 1451 (8th ed. 2004) ("[T]he period contained in a statute of
repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has
accrued or whether any injury has resulted." (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4
(1987))). The statute of limitations date is determined based upon the occurrence of an
injury or when the injury was discovered; whereas with a statute of repose, the timetable
commences based on the actions of a defendant and regardless of the plaintiffs discovery
of an injury. Id.
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consensus on this point, and courts have given little attention to the
subject.
One solution to these problems may be to differentiate between the
architect and builder of a non-compliant dwelling and the owners and
operators of the dwelling. This approach would effectively strike a bar-
gain between the majority and dissenting opinions in Garcia, applying the
majority analysis to architects and builders, but finding a continuing vio-
lation by those in control of the structure. As one court noted:
[T]his interpretation would establish an ongoing duty on the part of
the entities in control of a building to make corrections to bring it
into compliance with the FHA while limiting the liability of entities
whose involvement and control over the accessibility of a building
ends once the building is complete.23 0
Not only does this approach accomplish the goals the FHA was en-
acted to carry out, it operates in an incredibly logical and simple way.
While the initial violators may have ceased all involvement with the of-
fending structure, thus warranting the statute of limitations' running, the
"remaining [d]efendants continue to benefit from that oversight by rent-
ing inaccessible units."231 As such, the continuing violations doctrine
should capture that continuing practice but omit the past offenders-the
architects and builders.23 2
In any case, the proper resolution of these issues will have to wait.
Most recently, the Supreme Court denied rehearing the Garcia deci-
sion. 2 3 3 The Court probably denied certiorari because it would be rela-
tively premature to hear the case. After all, though a number of district
courts have weighed in on the issue, only two Courts of Appeals have
dealt with the FHA's statute of limitations in design and construction
cases. Thus, there is hardly a mature conflict among the courts of ap-
peals, and the Supreme Court is unlikely to hear the question until that
changes.
230. Kuchmas v. Towson Univ., 553 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (D. Md. 2008).
231. Id. at 563.
232. Of course, in the case of an ongoing pattern or practice by an architect of con-
struction firm of designing or building noncompliant structures, the continuing violations
doctrine can be appropriately invoked against those ongoing actions. See Californians for
Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., No. C 06-5125 SBA, 2009 WL 2982840, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) ("Garcia did not eliminate the continuing violations doctrine in
all [FHA] cases. Rather, Garcia simply held that there was no continuing violation be-
cause the tenant was not claiming that there were any ongoing unlawful acts, .. . [such as]
continued construction of non-compliant complexes.").
233. See generally Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub




Determining the appropriate limitations trigger for design and con-
struction claims under the FHA has proved to be a daunting task. This
Note has examined the three general approaches lower courts and courts
of appeals have taken in dealing with the issue and some of the gray areas
in between. In so doing, arguments in favor of each have been advanced,
and an ultimate solution has been proposed: hold the original architects
and builders to a strict two-year statute of limitations, commencing on the
completion of the design and construction phase. The flip-side of that
solution proposes that, in keeping with the broad remedial intent of the
FHA, the current owners and operators should be held liable for the con-
tinuing inaccessibility of a structure's noncompliant design and construc-
tion. This approach strikes a balance between disabled residents seeking
accessible housing and architects and builders seeking finality for their
past non-compliant design and construction. Obviously, a better solution
to this problem would be legislative clarification or hearing by the Su-
preme Court. The best solution, however, and one that is hopefully near,
is willing compliance with the FHA's design and construction require-
ments and the HUD guidelines for implementing them.
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